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不是翻译 —— 多数文档描述的行为已经不存在了。

先修一个更基本的问题：我们不拥有 u-claw.org 域名，那是上游的。所以之前写在
README、诊断包提示、联系方式里的 help@u-claw.org 全都会把用户的问题发给
上游 —— 一个没有理由回复的人。改为指向我们自己的 issue tracker，并加断言
禁止再出现指向该域名的支持入口。

重写（内容过时，不是语言问题）：
- install/README.md —— 还写着 10 个中国技能、DeepSeek 优先、国内镜像。
  现在按实际流程写：技能读 manifest、模型菜单 Gemini 优先、bundle 有
  SHA256 校验。并如实写明 curl|bash 在受管企业电脑上会被 EDR 拦。
- CLAUDE.md 的模型配置整节 —— 还在描述虾盘云首选卡片和 12 个 provider，
  那个界面已经换成单框 Key 输入了。
- SECURITY.md —— 安全报告原本指向上游维护者个人邮箱。fork 之后那条路由
  是错的：漏洞会发给写不了这份代码、也修不了的人。
- CONTRIBUTING.md —— 补上 fork 关系、pre-push 钩子怎么装、以及
  `node --test tests/` 为什么不能用。

翻译并保留：
- bootable/README.md、TROUBLESHOOTING.md —— 面向用户，顺带把
  「国内镜像」「小米/华为 BIOS 按键」等换成目标市场的实际情况

HANDOFF.md 重写为一份事故复盘：原文一半是过时的一次性交接笔记（引用的
website/guide.html 已不在本仓库），另一半是 persistence.dat 未格式化导致
启动失败的排查记录 —— 后者有长期价值，尤其是「读 offset 1080 的两字节
验证 ext4」这个判断方法，已同时写进 bootable/README.md。

bootable/IMPROVEMENTS_SUMMARY.md 保留中文，加了说明：它是上游 fork 前的
历史改进记录，没人引用，描述的是已完成的工作而非当前行为。翻译它反而会
让人误以为是现行文档。

新增 skills/en/uclaw-help —— 把「怎么用、东西在哪、出问题怎么办」做成
内置知识，每个角色都装。方案 C10.8：能问的产品才是不需要学的产品。

2026-08-17 19:12:07 +08:00

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Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not put details in a public issue.

Open a report at https://gitea.fanghe.it.com/zhenghy/u-claw/issues — mark it clearly as a security report and keep the details minimal until we can arrange a private channel.

This is a fork. Upstream is github.com/dongsheng123132/u-claw. If the issue is in code we inherited unchanged, it affects their users too — please tell them as well. If it is in something this fork changed (the launcher, the i18n layer, the skill installer, the key-check endpoint, the self-heal routines), it is ours.

We do not yet have a dedicated security address of our own. origin.json records that gap; until it is filled, the issue tracker is the route.

We will acknowledge within 3 working days and give a first assessment within 14 days. Please give us a chance to fix it before disclosing publicly.

What helps

Which module — portable/, install/, bootable/
Version or commit hash
How it is triggered, and from where: local, LAN, or the internet
Steps to reproduce, or a proof of concept
What you think the fix looks like, if you have a view

What is in scope

Command injection, path traversal, arbitrary write or code execution in U-Claw's own scripts
Injection through the loading or writing of data/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Launchers (START HERE - *, lib/start.mjs) being hijacked through a malicious directory name or environment variable
Man-in-the-middle exposure on the one-line install path (curl | bash, irm | iex)
Privilege escalation in what the bootable USB scripts produce
The key-check endpoint (/api/test-key) — it handles API keys server-side
The diagnostics report leaking a secret it should have redacted

What is not

Upstream dependencies — Node.js, OpenClaw, Electron, Ventoy, Ubuntu. Report those to their projects; we track and upgrade versions.
A user publishing their own API key in a screenshot or a public repo.
Physical access to the drive. If someone has the drive, they have the data — that is the trade a portable product makes, and it is stated plainly in the README rather than defended against.
What an attacker can do once they already have admin or root on the machine.

Supported

Module	Status
`portable/`	current `main` — reports accepted
`install/`	current `main` — reports accepted
`bootable/`	current `main` — reports accepted
`u-claw-app/`	deprecated 2026-06-19, no longer built or published
older tags	severity assessed, but no backported patches

There are no stable version numbers yet; fixes go straight to main.

Credit

Anyone who reports responsibly is credited in the fixing commit and the release notes, unless you would rather not be.

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